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Abstract—Web applications (webapps) are subjected con-
stantly to automated, opportunistic attacks from autonomous
robots (bots) engaged in reconnaissance to discover victims
that may be vulnerable to specific exploits. This is a typical
behavior found in botnet recruitment, worm propagation, large-
scale fingerprinting and vulnerability scanners. Most anti-bot
techniques are deployed at the application layer, thus leaving
the network stack of the webapp’s server exposed. In this paper
we present a mechanism called Hyp3rArmor, that addresses
this vulnerability by minimizing the webapp’s attack surface
exposed to automated opportunistic attackers, for JavaScript-
enabled web browser clients. Our solution uses port knocking
to eliminate the webapp’s visible network footprint. Clients of
the webapp are directed to a visible static web server to obtain
JavaScript that authenticates the client to the webapp server
(using port knocking) before making any requests to the webapp.
Our implementation of Hyp3rArmor, which is compatible with
all webapp architectures, has been deployed and used to defend
single and multi-page websites on the Internet for 114 days.
During this time period the static web server observed 964
attempted attacks that were deflected from the webapp, which
was only accessed by authenticated clients. Our evaluation shows
that in most cases client-side overheads were negligible and that
server-side overheads were minimal. Hyp3rArmor is ideal for
critical systems and legacy applications that must be accessible
on the Internet. Additionally Hyp3rArmor is composable with
other security tools, adding an additional layer to a defense in
depth approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
The World Wide Web (Web) is the foundation of the Informa-
tion Age, providing billions of people with a tool to discover,
learn, and share information. The Web is comprised of a vast
number of web servers that handle requests for information
from hosted websites. Web servers have the largest visible
footprint on the Internet [1], yet a recent report has found
that almost all websites have serious, exploitable security
vulnerabilities [2].
In order for attackers to capitalize on these vulnerabilities,
they must first identify potential victim web servers. This is
done through the use of automated, opportunistic agents (a.k.a.,
robots or bots) that scour the Internet for potential victims
based on some search criteria. Typically, bots search for a
vulnerable web application (webapp) through network scans
or through web application fingerprinting.
Network scans send a probe to each destination to identify
if it qualifies as a target. The probe may be as simple as check-
ing if a web server is running on the destination computer, by
checking if particular ports (e.g., port 80, 443, 8080, etc.) are
open, or by determining the type and version of the operating
system or the software running on the host. A popular strategy
used by bots is IP address network scanning which provides a
fast, efficient way to identify potential victims. For example,
a new ransomware strain, known as SamSam, includes worm
capabilities allowing it to spread through a network, encrypting
and holding users files hostage for money [3]. SamSam scans
the Internet for vulnerable Jboss web servers to compromise.
Currently, the IPv4 address space can be scanned in under 5
minutes [4].
Bots may also acquire targets through web application
fingerprinting. Probes are sent to a web server to elicit in-
formation about exploitable application-layer software used
at the server. In some cases the bot doesn’t even need to
search for exploitable applications; instead it could leverage
search engines to locate targets using application frameworks
with exploitable vulnerabilities (which may not yet be known
publicly, e.g., a zero-day vulnerability). Such search engine
query strings are known as dorks[5]. For example the query
allinurl: "wordspew-rss.php" will locate a SQL
injection vulnerability in a Wordpress plugin [6]. In 2013,
Google dorks were used to compromise 35,000 websites
running vulnerable message board software [7].
Typically, web applications use a cocktail of defenses to
protect themselves from automated attacks. Network firewalls,
intrusion detection systems (IDS), and intrusion prevention
systems (IPS) protect the server at the network layer, while
web application firewalls (WAF) provide protection at the
application layer. Additionally, there are several defensive
strategies that are specific to automated attacks, including
honeypot links and CAPTCHAs [8]. While these defenses
reduce the risks associated with autonomous attacks, they are
by no means satisfactory, as they typically exhibit a high-rate
of false positives, and are altogether ineffective against zero-
day attacks.
We posit that as long as a server maintains a visible foot-
print on the Internet (accepting packets from unauthenticated
clients), it remains susceptible to automated scans. Faced with
such risks, the only truly effective defense is to minimize the
server’s attack surface at the network layer by only accepting
packets from vetted clients (i.e., legitimate users and not bots).
Towards that end, a lesser-known and seldom-deployed
defense is port knocking, which conceals a network service on
the Internet, making it invisible to unauthenticated clients [9].
Generally speaking, port knocking allows a client to let a server
open an otherwise-closed port (i.e., ”white-list” the client)
through special one-way communication, or secret knocks.
Any client communication that does not start with a valid
knock elicits no response from the server, rendering the server
invisible to such client. More specifically, port knocking is
implemented by having the server’s firewall monitor incoming
network traffic. If a client ”knocks” by sending a packet
encoded with an authentication token (AT) that is associated
with a particular service, the client’s IP address is white-listed
for that service.1 If the client sent the correct sequences of
”knocks” to the server (i.e., by sending a sequence of TCP-
SYN packets with the correct destination port numbers) the
client’s IP address would be white-listed. Any other traffic is
summarily dropped by the firewall.
Port knocking, which is typically used to hide private
services (e.g., SSH), has not been widely adopted in other
protocols due to (1) the lack of a standardized key distribution
mechanism, and (2) the need for the client to generate, and
send packets encoded with the ATs. Thus, without modifying
the client to install client-side port knocking software, a
webapp’s attack surface exposed to automated opportunistic
attacks will exist. In this paper, we introduce Hyp3rArmor, a
new security regime that overcomes this limitation.
Hyp3rArmor uses port knocking to make the webapp’s
attack surface virtually non-existent, and thus appears hidden
to network scans, without requiring alteration to the client.2 A
visible web server, residing on a separate physical machine,
is introduced to replace the webapp’s visible footprint: Rather
than accessing the webapp’s server directly, a client is directed
to the visibile web server, which provides the client with
JavaScript code that induces the client’s browser to retrieve and
send an AT to the webapp’s hidden server for authentication.
Once authenticated, the JavaScript sends the original request
to the webapp. An AT provider, residing on the hidden web
server, publishes ATs to the visibile web server (e.g., using
scp or rsync). Alternatively, the AT provider can be hosted as
a separate service that distributes ATs directly to clients. A
simplified overview of Hyp3rArmor applied to a webapp is
illustrated in Figure 1.
In order to deny bots the ability to retrieve ATs,
Hyp3rArmor differentiates between legitimate clients and bots
by relying on one of two assumptions about the operation
of automated bots: (a) Bots search for servers to victimize
by scanning large blocks of the IP address space looking for
specific services without knowledge of the domain name under
which the service is offered, or (b) To be effective at scale,
bots must operate autonomously without human intervention
or assistance. Under the first, Hyp3rArmor uses knowledge of
the domain name as the secret needed by legitimate clients
to generate valid ATs. Under the second, for services offered
under a domain name for which the reverse mapping is (or
1Traditionally, an AT was represented by a set of destination port numbers
that client requests will target.
2The attack surface is not totally eliminated because the operating system
and port-knocking monitoring software must process packets, leaving the
lower layers of the network stack (transport and below) vulnerable. The risk
of exploits at those typically-hardened layers is low.
Fig. 1: High level overview of our Hyp3rArmor defense
applied to a web application.
must be) discoverable, Hyp3rArmor forces clients to solve a
one-time challenge that requires assistance from a human in
order to obtain a valid AT.
We have developed an open-source implementation of
Hyp3rArmor, and have deployed it as a defense for single-
page and multi-page web applications. Our evaluation has
shown that our Hyp3rArmor prototype imposes minimal over-
heads on both the client and server. With over 114 days of
being deployed on the Internet, our Hyp3rArmor prototype
has demonstrated its ability to protect a webapp from bots,
ensuring that the only packets that reached hidden web server
were from authenticated clients. As such, Hyp3rArmor adds a
valuable layer of protection for defense-in-depth approaches,
allowing it to be composed with other defenses such as
IDS/IPS and WAF.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
We start in Section II by introducing the threat model and
an assessment of associated risks. We follow that with an
overview of our proposed mechanism for minimizing a web
server’s attack surface in Section III and a detailed description
of the various components of our design in Section IV. In
Section V we present a security analysis of our mechanism.
In Section VI we present our Hyp3rArmor prototype and
evaluate its performance in Section VII. We provide additional
observations and discuss design choices and alternatives in
Section VIII. We present related work in Section IX and
conclude the paper with a summary of on-going and future
work in Section X.
II. THREAT ANALYSIS
A. Threat Modeling
Our adversary is software that operates automatically, without
human assistance or intervention. This includes autonomous
systems such as botnets and worms, as well as automated
scanners. In the remainder of this paper, for simplicity we refer
to these adversaries as bots. Bots are opportunistic attackers
in the sense that they do not know their victims a priori.
Instead, they perform reconnaissance to search for potential
victims. Reconnaissance may include network scanning and
application fingerprinting (e.g., Google dorks). Additionally,
bots may fetch pre-compiled “hit lists” such as the Alexa
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top 500 sites on the web.3 Once targets are acquired, the bot
performs the attack autonomously.
We consider attacks on the webapp’s entire software stack,
including operating system, web server, and application soft-
ware. Attacks may include, but are not limited to, exploita-
tion to compromise the machine, scraping, and vulnerability
scanning. We require that the target acquisition and attack be
performed automatically by bots, without human assistance.
We consider bots to be end points in a network. As such, they
do not engage in network traffic monitoring, and they do not
engage in other adversarial behaviors. Thus, for the purposes of
this paper, other types of attacks that may be mounted using
botnets, such as denial of service (DoS) attacks, are out of
scope. Finally, while we expect that bots will exhibit a high
level of sophistication and autonomy, we assume that there
exists a class of challenges (solvable by humans) that these
bots cannot solve.
We distinguish between two categories of bots: those
knowledgeable and those not knowledgeable of their target’s
identity, specifically its domain name. We refer to the former
as a Domain Name Aware Bot (DN-Bot), and refer to the latter
as a IP Aware Bot (IP-Bot). This distinction is based on the
reconnaissance method adopted by the attacker. For example,
if victims are found using Google Dorks, then knowledge of
the domain name comes for free, if it exists. However, if the
bot performs reconnaissance by IP scanning, additional work
is required to determine if the target’s domain name can be
resolved.
If the bot is knowledgeable of its target’s domain name,
then it readily has knowledge of the server’s IP address through
a forward DNS lookup. However, the inverse is not necessarily
true. IP addresses are not required to have a reverse DNS
lookup, and even if a record exists, it does not necessarily
reflect the domain name of the web application at the IP
address (e.g., virtual name-based hosting allows multiple web
applications with different domains to be assigned to a single
IP address). Although there may be other ways to derive the
domain name from an IP address, this can be made hard for
the attacker.
B. Risk Assessment
The effectiveness of our Hyp3rArmor mechanism depends on
how well the ATs are secured from bots. Otherwise, if the
bot obtains the AT, it only needs to authenticate itself to the
hidden web server and perform its attack as normal. Recall,
in Section II-A we identified bots as Domain Name Aware
Bot (DN-Bot) and IP Aware Bot (IP-Bot). Hyp3rArmor must
know (or otherwise assume) the bot type in order to defend the
webapp from the threat posed by the bot. DN-Bots encompass
the knowledge of IP-Bots, therefore using Hyp3rArmor for
DN-Bots also protects the webapp from IP-Bots.
The basis of our Hyp3rArmor defense from IP-Bots is the
use of virtual-name based hosting, which requires the client
to specify the webapp’s domain name in the Host HTTP
header when requesting web resources. Therefore if the bot
does not know its target’s domain, it will be unable to obtain
the AT. Hyp3rArmor defense from DN-Bots is based on the
3http://www.alexa.com/topsites
client solving a challenge (i.e., CAPTCHA). Hyp3rArmor for
DN-Bots requires human intervention, while Hyp3rArmor for
IP-Bots is completely transparent to the user. Therefore, for an
improved user experience, if the webapp is not vulnerable to
DN-Bots, the webapp should use a Hyp3rArmor for IP-Bots.
To determine which bot type a webapp is vulnerable to, we
developed the flow chart illustrated in Figure 2 to determine if
the webapp’s domain name is at risk of being targeted, and
if a domain name can be found given an IP address. We
elaborate on this risk assessment process (which determines
the appropriate defense) below.
If the webapp is accessible by an IP address as opposed to
a domain name, virtual name-based hosting is not an option
and Hyp3rArmor for DN-Bots should be used.
Next, the webapp must be analyzed to determine if it is at
risk of a bot searching for it by its domain. This is done by
cross-referencing the webapp’s software with existing Google
dorks, found in the Google Hacking Database [10]. If dorks
exist they should be removed.4
The webapp’s domain may exist in a list, which DN-Bots
may target. The nature and popularity of such a list greatly
affects the level of risk. On the one hand, inclusion in a list
such as the Centralized Zone Data Service (CZDS)5 list of
participating Top Level Domains carries a low risk as the
domain is not necessarily hosting a web server. On the other
hand, inclusion in a list such as Alexa is considered high risk
as evidenced by the use of these lists by automated software:
After the HeartBleed bug was disclosed, the top 1 million sites
on Alexa were regularly scanned to determine if they were
vulnerable [11]. Removal from such lists may be impossible.
For this reason we mark these decisions in the flow chart with
dotted lines.
If a bot cannot find the webapp by domain, bots may exist
that search for targets by IP scans and then attempt to find
the webapp’s domain given its IP address. Many techniques
exist to find this reverse mapping, e.g., Web sites storing IP-
to-domain mappings could be queried by a bot. Other sources
include checking if a DNS PTR record exists, and if a Whois
record contains values that may leak the domain name, e.g.,
an email address.
Lastly, if the web application is served over HTTPS, the
server must not respond with its certificate to a client that does
not first provide the domain name. Currently OpenSLL will
readily reveal its identity to anyone who requests its certificate.
We have made a patch to provide this functionality, details are
discussed in Section VI.
If the webapp domain is not a target, and an IP-to-domain
reverse mapping does not exist, Hyp3rArmor for IP-Bots is
sufficient, otherwise Hyp3rArmor for DN-Bots should be used.
III. HYP3RARMOR MECHANISM OVERVIEW
To minimize the webapp’s attack surface exposed to oppor-
tunistic bots, our Hyp3rArmor mechanism introduces three key
components: a port-knocking daemon, a visible web server,
and an AT provider. These components, along with their
4Google provides tools to remove entries from its index [7].
5https://czds.icann.org/
3
Fig. 2: Threat analysis to determine which bot the webapp is
vulnerable to, so Hyp3rArmor can be properly configured.
interactions with the webapp server and client browser, are
shown in Figure 3. The remainder of this section provides
an overview of these components and how these components
might be instantiated in order to deploy Hyp3rArmor on
existing web architectures.
A. Hyp3rArmor’s Port-Knocking Daemon
Our end goal is to protect the webapp from attack, under
the realistic and justified assumption that any webapp’s soft-
Fig. 3: An overview of Hyp3rArmor. Only a single AT provider
is used.
ware stack is exploitable (e.g., using zero-day attacks). As
software stacks continue to grow and increase in complexity,
so does the webapp’s attack surface. To virtually eliminate
the attack surface exposed to unauthorized clients, a port-
knocking daemon is installed on the web server. The daemon
continuously monitors attempted connections to the server,
looking for clients that exhibit a behavior consistent with a
valid “knock” – e.g., demonstrating possession of the correct
AT. If such a client is identified, then the client’s IP address
is temporarily white listed, and hence allowed to access the
web service. Traffic from non-white-listed clients is summarily
dropped.
Since clients will no longer be able to access the web
application without first obtaining the means to generate a valid
AT, a visible web server is used as the new access point for
clients. Therefore, the original webapp’s server (to be hidden)
is assigned to a new domain name, e.g., by appending a domain
label hidden to the original domain name, which is then
assigned to the visibile web server.
B. Hyp3rArmor’s Visible Web Server
Using Hyp3rArmor, the visibile web server only serves static
content (HTML, CSS and JavaScript), thus drastically reducing
the webapp’s reachable attack surface. The visible web server
is never modified based on any client requests, nor does it keep
state.6
When a client requests the root web page, the visibile web
server returns JavaScript code that provides the functionality
for the client to retrieve and send ATs to the port-knocking
daemon. By using JavaScript, the client does not require any
specially-installed software to send the ATs; it only requires a
JavaScript-enabled browser.
JavaScripts network privileges are limited when executed
within a browser; low level packet creation is not permitted.
6If using Hyp3rArmor for IP-Bots this server must adhere to all changes
in Section II-B.
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However JavaScript can make HTTP requests to arbitrary
destination ports. We leverage this functionality as a way to
communicate to the hidden web server that the client possesses
a valid AT by representing the AT as a multiset of k destination
port numbers. We describe this next.
For each destination port in the multiset representing the
AT, an Asynchronous JavaScript and XML (AJAX) GET re-
quest is sent with the URL format scheme://host:port,
where scheme is HTTP or HTTPS, host is the domain of
the hidden web server and port is the destination port.7 While
these requests will fail (because the client is not currently
white-listed), the port-knocking daemon on the hidden web
server will be able to record the set of port numbers targeted
by the TCP-SYN packet (the first packet of the 3-way TCP
handshake), and thus establish that the client possesses the AT.
To reduce the delay associated our JavaScript’s implemen-
tation of port knocking above, the AJAX requests are sent all at
once, and the port-knocking daemon is designed to reconstruct
out-of-order packets. After the AT has been sent, the JavaScript
code probes the hidden web server to check when the clients IP
address has been white listed. Once white listed, the JavaScript
makes the application request to the webapp.
C. Hyp3rArmor’s Authentication Token Provider
The AT provider generates and provides the ATs that are
necessary for client authentication using the port knocking
daemon. New ATs are generated periodically (every predefined
time step) requiring clients to re-authenticate to maintain
access to the webapp.8
In this paper, we present two AT constructions each pro-
viding a different scope. universal ATs are shared among all
clients, whereas IP-bound AT are bound to client IP addresses
and thus not shareable. Each of these AT constructions requires
a different design. We describe these next.
A universal AT provider runs on the hidden web server. At
a pre-configured time step, the universal AT provider generates
a random AT to be shared among all clients, publishing it
securely to the AT provider (requiring the provider to hold
special privileges to be able to do so, e.g SCP).
An IP-bound AT provider runs as a separate web service
and generates ATs individually for each client, using a secret
and the clients IP address, thus preventing the AT from being
shared with clients of different IP addresses. The port-knocking
daemon shares the secret with the IP-bound AT provider,
allowing the port-knocking daemon to correctly verify the
knocks.6
D. Website Architecture Modifications
Hyp3rArmor can be applied to any existing webapp, whether
the webapp is designed using a single-page or a multi-page
wsebsite architecture.
7From the perspective of the network, each knock is a TCP-SYN packet
targeting the AT destination port.
8Similar to DNS, the expiration time allows the AT to be revoked if needed.
Shorter lived ATs provide the defender with more control and also can limit
the time an attack may attempt to brute force the AT, but will also introduce
additional processing overheads due to increased number of requests.
A single-page website architecture provides an experience
similar to a desktop application. This architecture cleanly
separates the roles of the user interface (UI) from the applica-
tion business logic. When a website is designed as a single-
page application, client-side static content that defines the user
interface (i.e., HTML, CSS and JavaScript) is loaded. Through
AJAX requests, JavaScript code provides a bridge to a back-
end server hosting the application logic to dynamically respond
with content. The back-end server exposes an application
programming interface (API) defining how the JavaScript can
communicate with it. The back-end server is usually connected
to at least one database where it stores and retrieves data.
For performance reasons, it is common for the static content
and the servers accessible through the API to be hosted on
physically-separate machines (e.g., static content is commonly
hosted on a content delivery network (CDN) servers).
Applying Hyp3rArmor to single-page website architectures
is straightforward since the architecture already provides sepa-
ration of static and dynamic content. The back-end web server
(producing the dynamic content) poses a greater attack surface
and stores valuable data, and hence must be protected. The
only change is the inclusion of an additional JavaScript file
that implements the logic to retrieve and send the ATs to the
hidden web server. The back-end application server is installed
with the port knocking daemon and AT provider.
Multi-page applications are comprised of two or more
pages; requested content is defined by the resource at the
URL, and is retrieved through a page load. These pages are
commonly generated dynamically by the server.
Applying Hyp3rArmor to a multi-page applications in-
volves the JavaScript code redirecting requests to the webapp
loaded in an Iframe after authentication occurs. First, the multi-
page applications domain must be altered, appending a new
domain label (e.g., hidden.webapp.com). Next, a visibile
web server is created to host the JavaScript file and is assigned
the applications original domain. The JavaScript code must
keep the browser state and multi-page application hosted on
the hidden web server synchronized. Changes to the browser
input, such as page loads and navigation, must be reflected
in the Iframe. Changes to the Iframe must be reflected in the
browser (i.e., navigation and page titles).
The visibile web server must be prevented from responding
with a Resource Not Found error (i.e., 404). This can be
achieved by one of two methods: resource stub pages or config-
uring the visibile web server to rewrite URLs and always load
the document root, in effect making the occurrence of a 404
impossible. Resource stub pages are HTML files named after
resources existing on the webapp which include the JavaScript
authentication code. Stub files can be automatically generated
if given the webapp’s site map. However this approach does not
scale. An alternative, and preferred approach, is to configure
the visibile web server to always return the document root (i.e.
index.html) containing the JavaScript code.
To synchronize the browser with the Iframe, when the
client requests a resource (e.g., webapp.com/login), the
JavaScript extracts the relative URL (/login), and sets
the Iframe source to a URL with the host set to the
webapp’s new domain and the path of the relative URL
(hidden.webapp.com/login).
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To synchronize the Iframe with the browser, we subscribe
to the Iframe’s onload event, which is fired every time the
Iframes location changes. When this event is fired, document
properties such as the title, and most importantly navigation
and history are updated. Although the child document loaded
in the Iframe resides at a subdomain of visibile web server, the
parent document can still access its Document Object Model
(DOM) when the child sets the document.domain property
to the parent domain name.
IV. HYP3RARMOR MECHANISM DETAILS
In this section, we provide additional details for each
Hyp3rArmor component.
A. Hyp3rArmor’s Visible Web Server
The visible web server hosts the Hyp3rArmor static web files
to provide the functionality to authenticate to the hidden web
server. The details of this process are described in Algorithm 1.
Recall from Section III, Hyp3rArmor provides defenses for
IP Aware Bots and Domain Name Aware Bots. The defense
to use is specified as the BotDefense input. Additionally the
ATSrc specifies the URL where the AT can be loaded. If the
AT scope is universal, the universal AT provider publishes the
AT directly to the visibile web server thus the ATSrc is a local
URL. Otherwise, the ATSrc is the URL of the IP-bound AT
provider web service.
If Hyp3rArmor is for DN-Bots the client must solve a
challenge to obtain the AT. The challenge is obtained by
calling the getChallenge function. The challenge is then
displayed to the user with a countdown timer indicating the
amount of time available for the user to solve the challenge. If
the timer expires and an answer is not returned, the algorithm
returns false. Otherwise the answer is used as the key to
decrypt the cipher text to obtain the AT. If the Hyp3rArmor
is for IP-Bots, the AT is simply queried and returned without
human intervention. Once the AT is obtained, it is sent to the
hidden web server via the send function.
Until clients are authenticated, they cannot communicate
with the hidden web server. Therefore a client must probe
hidden web server to determine when it is granted access
(making the server visible to it). Ideally, this probe is as small
as possible such as an AJAX HTTP HEAD request, which
will not include the response body, for a service running on
the hidden web server. Alternatively, the JavaScript can probe
for an image such as a favicon to check whether or not it
can load. If the hidden web server does not become visible
after a pre-defined number of tries, the authentication fails.
For example, this could occur if the user incorrectly solves
the challenge.
The client is defined by an authentication policy detailing
when and how often the client should authenticate. We have de-
fined two policies: automated, and on-demand. The automated
authentication policy states that the client should automatically
re-authenticate when the AT expires, whereas the on-demand
policy states that the client should only re-authenticate if AT
has expired and a web request has been initialized. Automated
renewals allow the client to remain in an authenticated state
with the hidden web server, providing a proactive approach so
requests can be made without any delay.
Algorithm 1 Authenticate
Input: The type of bot to defend, BotDefense and the location
of the AT, ATSrc.
Output: True if authentication is successful, false otherwise.
1: if BotDefense is DN-Bot then
2: (CAT , challenge,ATExpire)= getChallenge(ATSrc)
3: sk = promptChallenge(challenge,ATExpire)
4: if answer then
5: AT = decryptsk(CAT )
6: else
7: return false
8: end if
9: else
10: (AT, ATExpire) = getAT(ATSrc)
11: end if
12: send(AT)
13: wait = 0
14: while not isServerVisible() do
15: if wait ≥ MAX_WAIT then
16: return false
17: end if
18: sleep(TIMEOUT)
19: wait += 1
20: end while
21: return true
B. Hyp3rArmor’s AT
ATs are generated by the AT provider. Algorithm 2 describes
this process, which we discuss below.
An AT is a multiset of k destination ports, which has a
maximum life specified by its time to live (TTL). All AT expire
at the same time. Duplicates are allowed in the AT, therefore
we represent it as an associative array data structure, where
the key is the destination port mapped to the frequency count
of each destination port.
ATs with universal scope are generated and published
by the hidden web server every AT TTL time units. Each
destination port number is randomly sampled from a uniform
distribution over the integer interval (0, 216).
To bind ATs to a client’s IP address, we introduce a visible
server hosting an AT provider web service. The hidden web
server must be able to verify ATs generated autonomously
by the visible server (which resides on a physical separate
machine). To this end we utilize the time-based one-time pass-
word (TOTP) algorithm [12]. The TOTP algorithm computes
one-time passwords from a shared secret, current time and time
step defining the life time of the password before a new one
is generated. To keep the hidden web server and IP-bound AT
provider synchronized, a master secret S is shared between
the two, while the AT TTL time defines the life time of the
one-time password, thus at any moment both will be able to
compute the same password.
The destination port is then constructed from a truncated
Hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) such that
its key is a one-time password derived from the TOTP, and
the message is a concatenation of the clients IP address and
an incremented counter.
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Algorithm 2 Generate
Input: The size k of the AT, the master secret S, the type
of bot to defend, BotDefense, the scope of the AT,
ATScope and the clients IP address, IP.
Output: A tuple including the AT for the defence type.
1: AT = {}
2: for c = 0 to k do
3: if ATScope is universal-AT then
4: dport = getRandomInt(216 − 1)
5: else
6: pw = TOTP(S, timeNow(), AT TTL)
7: dport = HMAC(pw, IP ◦ c) & 0xFFFF
8: end if
9: if dport ∈ AT then
10: AT [dport] += 1
11: else
12: AT [dport] = 1
13: end if
14: end for
15: ATExpire = −1× timeNow() mod AT TTL
16: if BotDefense is DN-Bot then
17: (challenge, sk) = genChallenge()
18: cAT = encryptsk(AT )
19: return (cAT , challenge, ATExpire)
20: else
21: return (AT, ATExpire)
22: end if
If an DN-Bot-based defense is used, the AT provider
generates a random (challenge, secret key) pair. Solving the
challenge produces the secret key which is then used to encrypt
the AT using a symmetric encryption algorithm. Finally the
Generate algorithm (shown in Algorithm 2) returns the cipher
text, challenge and time when the current AT will expire.
Otherwise the AT and its expiration time are returned for IP-
Bot defense.
C. Hyp3rArmor’s Port-Knocking Daemon
The port-knocking daemon continuously monitors incoming
TCP-SYN packets to detect valid ATs as described in Al-
gorithm 3. For IP-bound ATs, each client has a unique AT
thus requiring the daemon to first compute the clients AT
before it can verify that the received knock is valid. To
increase performance, the client’s AT is computed when the
first valid knock is received and cached until it expires. The
port knocking daemon maintains state of each client’s AT
progress in a cache, keyed using the clients IP address.
To account for network latency during validation, the
daemon is able to accept ATs within a window of time, using
a similar method used by the TOTP specification. This solves
the problem in situations where the client sends an AT at the
end of its life, but the verifier attempts to verify the knock for
the following time step due to the network delay imposed on
sending the knock. The client’s state is initialized with ATs
that would occur during a defined time window specified by
ATWindow. The daemon will attempt to match the received
destination port to an AT in the window to determine which AT
the client is sending. As suggested by [12] the window should
be no more than one time step in the past. Once initialized,
Algorithm 3 Verify
Require: The verification state, STATE.
Input: The destination port, dport, and source IP address,
IP.
Output: True if dport was verified, False otherwise.
1: if IP /∈ STATE or STATE[IP][expire] ≥ timeNow() then
2: STATE[IP] = {}
3: STATE[IP][ATWindow] = getATWindow()
4: STATE[IP][ATBuild] = {}
5: STATE[IP][M] = 0
6: STATE[IP][expire]= timeNow() + windowSize
7: end if
8: client = STATE[IP]
9: matchedWindow = []
10: for AT in client[ATWindow] do
11: if dport ∈ AT and
12: (dport /∈ client[ATBuild]) or
13: (client[ATBuild][dport] + 1 ≤ AT[dport]) then
14: matchedWindow.append(AT)
15: end if
16: end for
17: if len(matchedWindow) > 0 then
18: client[ATWindow] = matchedWindow
19: if dport /∈ client[ATBuild] then
20: client[ATBuild] = 1
21: else
22: client[ATBuild] += 1
23: end if
24: client[M] +=1
25: if client[M] ≥ M then
26: timeLeft = −1× timeNow() mod AT TTL
27: expireTime = timeNow() + timeLeft + AT TTL
28: addToWhiteListQueue(IP, expireTime)
29: delete IP from STATE
30: end if
31: return True
32: else
33: delete IP from STATE
34: return False
35: end if
the client has as long as the AT window size to finish sending
the rest of the knocks, specified by expire. As the daemon
receives correct knocks from the client they are added to the
clients ATBuild state. The number of correct knocks are
tracked by M.
Every time a TCP-SYN packet is received, the destination
port is checked if it exists in the AT window. If it does, it is
checked to ensure that it doesn’t exceed the expected count
since an AT may contain duplicates. The client’s ATWindow
is then reassigned to all matched ATs in the window, thereby
decreasing the size of the window until the true AT is left.
When at least M valid knocks have been received, the
client will be granted access to the webapp: The client’s IP
address will be white-listed for the remaining and the next AT
cycle. This allows the client to proactively renew their access
ahead of time, thus minimizing any client side delay sending
requests to the webapp.Therefore, the maximum time that a
client will be white listed for is 2×AT TTL. For white-listed
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clients, the IP address and access expiration is tracked allowing
the daemon to periodically revoke all expired clients.
If an invalid knock is received, the server’s security access
control policy specifies how the client will be handled. For
example, a strict policy may be to black list the client’s IP
address.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security of Hyp3rArmor is defined by its ability to guard
the AT and its ability to resist brute-force attacks. As outlined
in Section II-B, the AT is guarded differently depending on the
type of bot. Given the rapidly evolving landscape of automated
threats, we provide multiple options to protect from current
and future threats. Protection from IP-Bots is reliant on it
being hard to obtain a domain name given an IP address.
While protection from DN-Bots is based on the security of
the challenge and the symmetric encryption used.
The scope of the AT (whether it is universal or bound to the
client’s IP address) determines who is able to possess the AT.
Any client possessing a valid universal AT can be authenticated
to the hidden web server. IP-bound ATs limit the AT’s use to
only the IP address for which it was assigned. This renders
inconsequential the leakage of an AT to bots. The security of
IP-bound ATs is dependent on the secrecy of the master secret
for the time-based one-time password (TOTP).
Assuming that the bot is unable to obtain the AT, the only
other available option for the bot to gain access to the hidden
web server is to brute-force attack the AT. As we explained
earlier, the AT is a multiset of destination port numbers to
allow out-of-order processing. However by doing so, the set X
of all ATs decreases in size in comparison to if the destination
port numbers were sent and received in order allowing an
encoding as a single string. The size of X for ATs of length k
is |X| =
((
216
k
))
=
(
216+k−1
k
)
< 216k.
A comparsion of the entropy H of each encoding scheme
is shown in Figure 4, specifying the number of bits required to
encode an AT for each scheme. Although there is a noticeable
decrease in entropy encoding ATs using a multiset (as opposed
to an ordered set), it is at most an addition of an extra
destination port for when entropy is 100 bits or less.
We model the execution of a brute-force attack as a bot
randomly sampling an AT from X , without replacement, and
sending it, along with a reconnaissance probe, to the server.
The bot succeeds if the AT is accepted and the probe signifies
that a web service is running, otherwise they fail. We give the
bot an advantage by assuming that the bot knows the size k
of the AT. We are interested in the expected time, T , it takes
to brute-force an AT with a rate µ.
E[T ] =
(k + 1)
µ
1
|X|
|X|∑
i=1
i =
(k + 1)
µ
|X|+ 1
2
(1)
The bot’s attack rate potential is limited by their hardware,
network access and ability to collude with others (i.e., a
botnet). Currently off-the-shelf scanning software such as
ZMap can scan near 15 million probes per second (MPPs)
with a 10 gigabit Ethernet link [4]. At these speeds, an AT
with k = 1 has an expected brute-forced time of 4.4ms, with
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Fig. 4: Comparison of AT encoding scheme entropy.
k = 3 this increases to over two months. We note, however,
that an attack on a single target at these rates is more of a
denial of service (DoS) attack, which would be presumably
addressed using other deployed mechanisms (and is outside
the scope of this paper).
More importantly, Hyp3rArmor is for opportunistic attack-
ers who are resource-bound in regards to funding and time.
Finding exploitable systems is a race against time, especially
in the case of newly disclosed vulnerabilities as witnessed in
the past [7], [11]. Due to these constraints, the AT size can
be substantially less than that used for symmetric encryption,
which NIST currently recommends to be 128 bits for AES
[13].
VI. HYP3RARMOR PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
We have developed and deployed a fully-functional open-
source prototype implementation of the Hyp3rArmor defense.
Our prototype consists of three separate packages, correspond-
ing to client-side functionality, server-side functionality, and
the AT provider functionality.
The client-side functionality is implemented as JavaScript
code for authentication. The JavaScript is configured with
the AT source URL and the subdomain of the hidden web
server. The JavaScript code does not introduce any client-
side dependencies. However, to provide a seamless transition
for single-page applications built using this framework, we
developed a shim for jQuery.9 The only modifications required
is to include an additional script tag pointing to the JavaScript
source and its initial configuration.
The server-side functionality is implemented as a daemon
to authenticate clients and generate universal ATs. The daemon
is written in Python 2.7 and follows a producer/consumer
design pattern for AT verification and client white listing.
The producer process continuously monitors incoming
TCP-SYN packets via the Python library Pcapy,10 which
interfaces with the libpcap packet capture library, or option-
ally through firewall logs. Cryptographic operations used to
9https://jquery.com/
10https://coresecurity.com/corelabs-research/open-source-tools/pcapy
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generate and verify IP-bound ATs are computed with the
Cryptography Python library.11 When a valid AT is received,
the clients IP address is added to the producer-to-consumer
queue.
The consumer process pulls from the queue and dynam-
ically white lists the IP address which is granted access the
webapp port. A rule is appended to iptables using the Python-
iptables library.12 The expiration time is placed in the rule’s
comment. An additional thread periodically revokes access for
expired entries.
Our implementation of the universal AT provider is embed-
ded in the Hyp3rArmor server daemon. An internal clock, with
a period equal to the AT TTL, generates an AT as defined in
Algorithm 2. Once generated it is exported to the file system
allowing the system administrator to configure how the AT
is published to the visibile web server. ATs are exported in
JSON format, containing an array of destination ports and
the time when the AT will expire. Hyp3rArmor for DN-Bots
uses the Python Imaging Library (PIL)13 to randomly generate
CAPTCHAs. The answer to the CAPTCHA is used as the key
to encrypt the AT using an XOR cipher.
Our Hyp3rArmor implementation also contains a stan-
dalone IP-bound AT web service to allow ATs to be bound
to the clients IP address. The web services is also written
in Python 2.7 using the Twisted Web 13.2.0 framework.14
The web server is enabled with virtual name-based hosting to
defend from IP-Bots. When a client makes a request, the source
IP address is used to generate the AT as defined in Algorithm 2.
In cases where the web service is sitting behind a proxy
(e.g., Nginx), the web service first checks the X-Real-IP
HTTP header to check if it has been written by the proxy.
To allow the JavaScript to request resources from this web
services, Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) is enabled
for the configured domain. The AT output is equivalent to the
universal AT provider.
VII. PERFORMANCE AND EFFICIENCY OF HYP3RARMOR
In this section, we evaluate the performance and effectiveness
of our Hyp3rArmor prototype implementation.
A. Evaluation Set-up
We applied Hyp3rArmor to two web sites on the Internet.
While the websites provide the same functionality (a sim-
ple clock), they are built using the two design architectures
discussed earlier: One is designed as a single-page applica-
tion and the other is designed as a multi-page application,
reachable at spa.example.com and mpa.example.com,
respectively.
Our setup consists of three Amazon EC2 micro instances
each running a software stack of Ubuntu 14.04, Nginx 1.4.6
and a patched OpenSSL 1.0.2 (required by Section II-B).
These servers contain a single core Intel CPU operating at
2.40GHz 1GB memory. The first instance is used for the
visibile web server. The second instance is used for the
11https://cryptography.io
12http://ldx.github.io/python-iptables/
13http://www.pythonware.com/products/pil/
14http://twistedmatrix.com/trac/wiki/TwistedWeb
hidden web server with the Hyp3rArmor server-side software
installed. The third instance is used for the AT provider web
service when IP-bound ATs are used. When using universal
ATs, the hidden web server uses rsync to publish ATs to the
visibile web server. The domains spa.example.com, and
mpa.example.com are mapped to the IP address of the
visibile web server, while the hidden web server is assigned
the domain hidden.sample.com. Additionally the AT
provider web services is mapped to at.example.com.
Measures were taken to remove fingerprints from the visi-
bile web server such as the version and name in HTTP headers,
configuring the firewall to only expose our web servers, and
modifications to OpenSSL to require the client to supply the
domain name in the ClientHello message.
We use a separate EC2 instance as a jump server to
administer visibile web server and hidden web server from
a single static IP address. The firewall rules on the servers are
set to only allow SSH connections from the jump server, thus
removing the visibility of this service.15 The jump server hides
its SSH port using KnockKnock [14].
The websites protected using our Hyp3rArmor proto-
type implementation were created using TwistedWeb. The
single-page application contains a single RESTful web ser-
vices running on the hidden web server with an endpoint
GET hidden.example.com/time to obtain the time.
An HTML file hosted on the visibile web server contains
JavaScript to make AJAX requests to the web service to
update the time on the web page, as well as the Hyp3rArmor
JavaScript code. The multi-page application hosted on the
hidden web server uses HTML templating to generate a page
dynamically with the time for each request. A stub HTML
page is hosted on visibile web server to include Hyp3rArmor
JavaScript code providing redirection capabilities. Each web-
site is configurable to retrieve ATs from either the AT provider
web service or at a local URL where the published universal
AT can be retrieved.
B. Authentication Time
Our first set of experimental results report on the time it
takes a browser to authenticate to the hidden web server, and
consequently the overhead imposed by Hyp3rArmor on client-
side perceived performance. More specifically, we measured
the time it takes to perform Algorithm 1, i.e., fetch the AT,
send it to the hidden web server and verify the client has been
authenticated.
We measure the delay for universal ATs, and IP-bound
ATs and compare that to the delay in responding to a request
with our Hyp3rArmor defense disabled. Our client is Firefox
48.0 to simulate typical browsing performance. The client
authenticates every 30 seconds, while the AT TTL is 10
seconds, thus ensuring that each authentication requires a new
AT to be retrieved.
Results shown in Figure 5 are from an average of 10
experiments for AT sizes one to eight. An AT of size zero
is the delay with Hyp3rArmor disabled. Error bars indicate
15There are other methods to accomplish the same goal without a jump
server such as installing a separate port knocking system for SSH on each
server, however this provided us with the most flexibility.
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Fig. 5: Comparison of authentication time for universal ATs
and IP-bound ATs.
the variance across trials. The results show that authentication
time using IP-bound AT is considerably higher (and also grows
more rapidly) than that using universal AT. For a single knock,
compared to the response time with Hyp3rArmor disabled, we
observed more than a two-fold increase in authentication time
using universal ATs and about a four-fold increase using IP-
bound ATs.
In terms of impact on the user experience, as a general
rule of thumb, response times less than one second will be
unnoticeable by users [15] and larger response times will be
perceived as a degradation in quality of service.
With Hyp3rArmor’s port-knocking enabled and using a
reactive authentication policy (i.e., one in which the client
authenticates every single per request), the user will experience
a 3-second delay for IP-bound AT and a 7-second delay for
universal AT. The longer delay for universal AT (compared
to IP-bound AT) comes with a gain of more than 54 bits of
entropy as shown in Figure 4.
We note that with a Hyp3rArmor IP-bound AT imple-
mentation, an automated renewal policy with AT TTL >
(2× k)seconds for an AT size k would result in no perceived
delays by the client.
C. Verification and Rejection Throughput
Our second set of experiments aim to evaluate the maximum
load that our Hyp3rArmor prototype can withstand. We do so
by measuring the verification throughput (rate of successful
authentication) and rejection throughput (rate of subverted
requests) for each AT construction. This is also helpful for
the purpose of comparison with a web server’s throughput to
determine if the adoption of a Hyp3rArmor defense would
introduce a bottleneck.
We focus our throughput analysis specifically on the ver-
ification code block as specified in Algorithm 3, and execute
the experiment on the same server to remove the network
as a possible bottleneck. Recall this server has a single core
with 1GB memory. For verification throughput we simulate
one million unique clients sending valid ATs of size k. For
rejection throughput we simulate one million invalid packets
sent to the server, each originating from a unique IP address.
Results from this experiment are reported in Figure 6.
These results show that processing universal ATs is dras-
tically faster than processing IP-bound ATs. On average,
universal ATs are verified 16 times faster than IP-bound ATs;
the rejection rate for universal ATs is 137 times faster than that
for IP-bound ATs. This comes as no surprise since the AT must
be generated individually for every new client when using IP-
bound ATs to be able to verify if the received destination port
is valid. This consists of computing a TOTP and an HMAC to
bind the IP address to the port. A TOTP is constructed with
an HMAC therefore for each received port this requires two
HMAC calculations or four hashes. Using universal ATs, the
processing overhead is minimal since ATs are pre-computed
for the duration of the ATs TTL.
Although processing IP-bound ATs incurs large overheads,
the achievable throughput compares favorably to that of an
Apache server’s throughput, when the AT size is less than
four (6K actions/sec)[16]. Verifying universal ATs for the max
tested AT size of 8 has a throughput close to twice that of
Nginx Stable (60,658 verifications per second compared to
30,487 requests per second), which is listed as the fastest
benchmarked web server.
D. Hyp3rArmor Effectiveness
Our last set of experimental results aim to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of Hyp3rArmor in minimizing the exposed attack
surface of the webapp’s server. We perform this evaluation by
first conducting our own attack surface analysis of the deployed
websites, and then by analyzing measurements obtained from
the in-the-wild deployment of our Hyp3rArmor prototype.
An attack surface is defined by [17] as the set of entry/exit
points, channels and untrusted data items of a system. To
assess the attack surface of the deployed websites from the
context of a bot, we performed vertical port scans (i.e., ports
1 to 65535) to identify the visible entry and exit points. The
network scanner, Nmap16, found the hidden web server to have
all ports closed, while the visibile web server has ports 80 and
443 open (the minimal for an HTTP/S server). The application
layer of the visibile web server does not contain any entry/exit
points as this server only hosts static content. However the
visibile web server has two ports open, allowing anyone on
the Internet to send packets to be processed all the way up
the network stack (e.g., it is susceptible to Heartbleed [11]
and ShellShock [18] attacks). Furthermore the port-knocking
daemon is a communication channel which can be used to
invoke methods on the hidden web server and is therefore
part of the attack surface. The only untrusted data we receive
is from libpcap, or we read from the firewall logs, in which
IP addresses and destination port numbers are extracted from
packets and sanitized. Given the visibile web server and the
hidden web server have identical software stacks, Hyp3rArmor
reduces the overall attack surface and isolates compromises to
the visibile web server.
16https://nmap.org/
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Fig. 6: AT Verification (top) and Rejection (bottom) Through-
put of Hyp3rArmor for both AT constructions.
For a DN-Bot defense, compromising the visibile web
server does not put the hidden web server at any greater
risk. The bot still needs to solve the challenge to decrypt
the AT to obtain authorization to hidden web server. For a
IP-Bot defense, compromising the visibile web server would
gain them access to the AT and thus the hidden web server.
This risk could be decreased with additional hardening, such
as the use of an intrusion prevention system (IPS) to detect
system compromises and respond by locking down the system
and destroying the AT to prevent escalation to the hidden web
server. The visibile web server would be an ideal candidate for
defenses such as a N-variant systems [19] due to the minimal
load compared to the hidden web server.
A threat analysis, as outlined in Section II-B, was con-
ducted to determine the risk of an IP-Bot obtaining the AT,
results are displayed in Table I. The DNS PTR record and
Whois identifies our servers as Amazon which is a benefit of
using third-party hosting. We use Zgrab17 to obtain the TLS
banner. Due to our OpenSSL modific tions, TLS banner grab
fails since the server name indication (SNI) is not specified.
Our results show there is not a risk of a bot identifying the
domain from the aforementioned identifier methods.
17https://github.com/zmap/zgrab
To evaluate the effectiveness of a deployment of
Hyp3rArmor to protect against threats “in the wild”, we
collected access logs from the visibile web server and hidden
web server web servers for 114 days. During this time, not a
single unauthorized web request was made to the hidden web
server. In contrast, the logs of the visibile web server show
significant number of unsolicited in-bound traffic. A detailed
breakdown of the servers activity is summarized in Table II.
We categorized each request as either benign or malicious,
and we also recorded whether the request was made using the
server IP address or using its domain name. Our classification
considered search engine crawlers and scanners grabbing the
document root (i.e., “GET /”) as benign traffic. Search engine
crawlers are identified by IP address and user agent. Further-
more, any traffic/activity due to our own experiments have
been excluded from these results. In addition to categorizing
requests as benign or malicious, we also characterized mali-
cious requests based on their behavior, e.g., requests attempting
to use our server as a proxy, requests probing our server to
identify if a particular resources exists, and requests attempting
code injection and ShellShock attacks.
Our results show that all malicious requests are made to the
server’s IP address and not to the domain name, suggesting that
the bot source is enumerating IP address to search for victims.
The majority of the attacks we observed originated from a
bot known as Muieblackcat, targeting vulnerabilities in PHP
applications [20]. We obtained 6 requests for the document root
by domain name for which we cannot establish the intended
purpose: the user agents indicate a standard browser as the
origin, and the requests were all for the document root. These
very well could be legitimate users.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we we discuss considerations that are important
for deploying Hyp3rArmor, as well as alternative design and
implementation choices and open questions.
A. Hyp3rArmor Defense versus Proxy Server Defense
A reverse proxy server is a proxy server that responds to
requests on behalf of an origin web server. Requests made
to the origin web server first flow through the proxy, which
is then forwarded to the origin server. The use of a proxy
server provides many security benefits, including hiding the
location of the origin server and deployment of web application
firewalls (WAF). As such, proxy servers may be seen as an
alternative to a Hyp3rArmor defense.
Many third-party providers offer reverse proxies as a
service (e.g., Akamai, Cloudflare, and Amazon). Cloudflare’s
WAF even has a setting to present clients with a challenge that
must be solved before the request is forwarded to the origin
server, similar to our Hyp3rArmor for DN-Bots [21].
When used to proxy for an HTTPS website, the website
administrator must share the private key used for encrypting
HTTPS traffic with the third-party service provider so that the
provider is able to act on behalf of the website[22]. Given
that private key, the third-party is able to inspect the website’s
inbound traffic. For websites that involve the exchange of
sensitive data this is a serious issue.
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Identifier Method Tool Result Risk Level
IP address, domain name pair indexed Google search None None
PTR Record dig ec2-server IP.compute-1.amazonaws.com None
Domain in Whois whois Amazon Technologies Inc. None
Get certificate by IP Zgrab TLS banner grab Conversation error with remote host None
Overall Risk None
TABLE I: Risk analysis of an IP-Bot identifying the server’s domain name given only the server’s IP address
Domain IP
Benign
Crawler 169 0
Scan 0 482
Unknown 6 0
Malicious
Proxy 0 93
Probe 0 781
Code Injection 0 78
ShellShock 0 12
Sub Total 175 1446
TABLE II: Summary of requests made to visible web server
Our Hyp3rArmor mechanism does not suffer from this vul-
nerability since the visibile web server acts more as a redirect
than a proxy, and as such the webapp’s traffic does not flow
through it. Using Hyp3rArmor, the website administrator can
create two separate certificates: one for the visibile web server
and the other for the hidden web server. The administrator
never needs to share their private key for the hidden web server
hosting the webapp.
Another disadvantage of using proxy servers is the neces-
sity for proxies to act as forwarding/relay agents for all the
website’s inbound and outbound traffic. This is typically done
through the use of line-speed hardware acceleration. While
such a solution allows proxies to sustain high throughput
to/from the an origin server, it tends to introduce delays since
all traffic must first pass through it before going to the origin
server. Our Hyp3rArmor mechanism does not suffer from
this “relaying” overhead: once a client is authenticated, all
traffic flows directly to the webapp’s server without the need
for an intermediate forwarding/relay agent. The processing
requirements of a visibile web server compared to its proxy
counterpart is minuscule.
Interestingly, for these same reasons, using redirection (as
opposed to proxying) has been the norm used by botnets for
a long time [23]. Botnets use a layer of bots for redirection
to hide the identity of the command and control server (a.k.a.,
mothership). Due to the limited resource capabilities of most
bots (which tend to be compromised home computers), redi-
rection is preferred to relaying.
B. Suggested Hyp3rArmor Configurations
To maintain secure Hyp3rArmor configurations, threat mon-
itoring will play an important role to observe evolving op-
portunistic attack behaviors. Honeypots, or decoy servers, can
provide us with this intelligence [24], [25].
Evidence from our evaluation suggests that current oppor-
tunistic bot attacks are not sophisticated. Given the current
threat landscape, universal ATs are sufficient for preventing
automated attacks from opportunistic attacks which provide
minimal overhead. Determining the AT size should take into
consideration the attackers search space. Given current network
link capacities and scanning rates, an AT of size three would
be acceptable for Internet facing webapps. If the search space
is decreased (e.g., due to the use of an internal network)
the attacker could potentially spend more time attempting
to brute-force the AT. However, sending a large number of
requests of this nature would certainly trigger IDS/IPS sensors.
Configuring a firewall to rate limit request and ban malicious
uses could further decrease the size of the AT.
C. Deployment Considerations
Hyp3rArmor stops all bots from accessing the hidden web
server, including search engine bots (e.g., GoogleBot). In fact,
this is necessary because if the webapp hosted on hidden web
server was indexed, a user trying to access the link would not
be able to do so since they would not have necessarily been
white-listed, and therefore the website would appear down.
Without the ability to crawl a website, search engine
optimization (SEO) will be affected. Only the static content
hosted on the visibile web server will be crawled and indexed.
This may be a deciding factor on whether or not to deploy
this defense. For sensitive, security conscious websites, SEO
is a secondary consideration and the use advantage from using
Hyp3rArmor far outweighs the benefit from SEO.
Some organizations use egress filter at network edges
to control out going traffic. This would cause problems for
Hyp3rArmor given its current AT generation algorithm. This
can be addressed by having system administrators modify
egress filters to allow sending TCP-SYN packets to any
destination ports for pre-approved domains and IP address
using Hyp3rArmor. It may also be possible to dynamically
change egress policies. For example, the edge device could
perform a reverse DNS lookup on the IP address and look
for a domain label indicating the server at the IP address
using Hyp3rArmor. Additionally, other AT encodings may able
to coexist with strict egress policies. Introducing a temporal
dimension and only targeting HTTP/S ports 80 and 443 could
be an option to encode ATs. This will have to be investigated
further to determine how practical this would be.
Challenges other than CAPTCHAs may be favorable to or-
ganizations to defeat DN-Bots. Disconnected tokens, e.g., RSA
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SecurID18, are commonly used for two-factor authentication
and could also be used to generate ATs.
As we mentioned in our threat model, denial of service
(DoS) is out of scope as it involves a specific target and
this paper is focused on opportunistic attackers. Nevertheless,
DoS is always a concern when deploying any new solution or
services. An adversary, familiar with the operational charac-
teristics of Hyp3rArmor, could mount a DoS attack by forging
the source IP addresses of TCP-SYN packets, and thus denying
legitimate users originating from the forged IP address block
from authenticating. The effectiveness such a DoS attack will
greatly depend on the servers access policy (e.g., ignoring these
packets versus black listing the source IP). Existing techniques
to detect spoofed packets [26] could mitigate this risk.
D. Miscellaneous Optimizations
The performance of our Hyp3rArmor prototype implementa-
tion could be further improved using a set of miscellaneous
optimizations. We discuss a few of these below.
Browser cookies can improve the users’ experience and
reduce unnecessary verification overhead on the hidden web
server. Once the client is authenticated, a permanent cookie
could be created and set to expire when the AT expires. This
allows the authentication state to be saved even when the
user closes their browser. The next time the user accesses the
website, the cookie is first checked before re-authenticating to
the hidden web server. These cookies would be created and
read by JavaScript and thus the HTTP-only flag would not be
set. The HTTP-only flag is used to prevent cross-site scripting
(XSS) attacks from occurring by disallowing JavaScript from
accessing these cookie. However XSS is not a threat to the
visibile web server as it only serves static content therefore
not allowing the XSS attack to persist.
To detect mobile users switching between networks, the
IP address at the time of authentication would also have to
be saved. If using the IP-bound AT provider web service it
could provide additional functionality to tell the client of its
public IP address. Alternatively, there is an HTML5 extension,
WebRTC, able to obtain the clients local IP address [27].
Finally, we note that our current implementation is in
Python. Thus verification and rejection throughput could be
increased if Hyp3rArmor is implemented in a lower level
language such as C.
IX. RELATED WORK
From the moment criminals began using software to automate
malicious tasks, researchers have responded with defenses. In
the context of opportunistic attacks, potential victims are found
through network reconnaissance and application fingerprinting.
Increasing the difficultly of information gathering has been
a popular research area in Moving Target Defense (MTD). A
survey of the different dynamic networks was presented in
[28] which describes techniques for frequently change network
configurations to confuse the attacker. For example, IP hopping
is a defense to make reconnaissance difficult for an attacker by
18https://www.rsa.com/en-us/products-services/identity-access-
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frequently changing the IP address of the end hosts [29], [30].
This type of defense is effective against hit-list based worms,
which first create a list of targets before moving onto the attack
phase. An analysis of the effectiveness of these MTD strategies
has been presented in [31].
Other approaches, such as port knocking, resist network
reconnaissance by attempting to make a server/service entirely
invisible to network scanners. Port knocking has been around
for some time with many different proposed schemes. In
2001, Christian Borss, in a Linux User Group Mailing List
[32] proposed a method equivalent to port knocking. Shortly
after, [33] proposed a scheme to conceal a service from non-
authenticated users. In their work, authentication tokens are
encoded as a sequence of destination port numbers which
they refer to as Spread-Spectrum TCP (SSTCP). SSTCP was
constructed with stateful protocols in mind, such as SSH, in
which authentication only needs to occur once at the beginning
of a session. This approach bears resemblance to the port-
knocking implementation in Hyp3rArmor.
Vasserman et al. [34] defines a formal security model for
port knocking. Although there is no port knocking standard,
there is a draft for TCP Stealth, [35] which encodes an AT in
a TCP initial sequence number. Other strategies such as single
packet authentication, have a similar goal in mind [36]. Single
packet authentication decreases delay time of multi-packet
knocking schemes by including access and authentication
information in a single packet.
Koch et al. proposed a defense to prevent bots from
attacking servers by IP address using port knocking[37]. Their
approach can be seen as a generalization of our risk assessment
for IP-Bots.
Fingerprinting of system and application software has been
used for reconnaissance purposes. For example, the network
scanner Nmap has the ability to determine the operating system
a host is running. Many techniques to prevent operating system
fingerprinting have been outlined by [38]. These methods
make changes to the operating system to remove or modify
characteristics that would otherwise make them unique.
Defenses against automated attackers searching for poten-
tial victims using application fingerprinting have also been
proposed. For example, Toffalin et al. proposed defenses
against the use of Google dorks by obfuscating URLs and
by inserting invisible characters into dork words [5].
Once an attacker acquires its targets, the attack is exe-
cuted. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) attempt to detect
such attacks and resulting intrusions using monitoring sensors
deployed in the environment (e.g., firewall logs) [39]. Attacks
are typically detected from anomalies and misuse. However
classifying events as malicious can be a difficult task. Efforts
to introduce artificial intelligence to build more robust IDSs
have also been made [40].
IDSs do not understand protocols at the application layer.
Thus, defenses have been proposed that focus on attack
prevention at the application layer. Scott et al. proposed an
application level firewall (referred to as a security gateway)
with user defined validation constraints and transformation
rules [41]. The security gateway provides a customized defense
for the web application. However, these solutions are primarily
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based on pattern matching against predefined signatures, and
therefore are ineffective against zero-day vulnerabilities or
other unknown malicious requests.
Defenses using anomaly detection have also been devel-
oped to protect against web based attacks [42]. In addition to
an anomaly-based web application firewall, TokDoc [43] has
the ability to react to malicious tokens found in a request and
render them benign.
In some cases the request may seem benign, for example
a bot scrapping or mirroring a website. A survey of frequently
used defenses to weed out automated bot traffic was conducted
by [8]. These techniques are primarily focused on the web ap-
plication layer, including the use of graphical and audio turing
tests. CAPTCHAs, the most well-known of these techniques,
uses problems that can be solved by humans but not by current
computer programs [44]. Advances in artificial intelligence
(AI) have made text-based turing tests ineffective. Mosaic-
based Human Interactive Proofs (MosaHIP) exploit current
computer vision challenges by requiring the user to distinguish
between real and fake images [45].
Polymorphism techniques [46], [47] have a similar goal
to CAPTCHAs but attempt to prevent automated web attacks
without human intervention. This defense alters the underlying
client-side web code to make it difficult for automated attackers
to interact with the web page.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced Hyp3rArmor, a new security
system to minimize a web application’s attack surface from
opportunistic automated attackers. Our contributions include
(1) characterization – threat modeling and risk assessment – of
automated opportunistic attacks to which a web applications
are exposed; (2) Hyp3rArmor, a defense mechanism which
minimizes a web application’s attack surface exposed to au-
tomated opportunistic attacks; (3) an open-source prototype
implementation of Hyp3rArmor; and (4) an extensive evalu-
ation of the performance and effectiveness of a Hyp3rArmor
prototype implementation which we deployed in the wild.
Our experimental evaluation has demonstrated the benefits
from protecting a web application’s network stack from unau-
thorized access when exposed to real-world threats. Attacks
attempted (on an hourly basis) on websites protected by
Hyp3rArmor is evidence of how active these threats are. Not
only does Hyp3rArmor provide protection from threats caused
by bots engaged in reconnaissance, but perhaps more impor-
tantly, Hyp3rArmor provides an additional layer of security
from future unknown attacks, including zero-day attacks.
Our work so far has focused on eliminating opportunistic
attacks and reducing application attack surfaces. While our
Hyp3rArmor mechanism is totally transparent to clients, it
does require architectural changes in the way a web application
is deployed. With the increased interest in the use of cloud
platforms, we are currently developing Hyp3rArmor “as a
service” to allow existing webapps to easily adopt this defense
as an add-on service, which can be seamlessly composed with
other defenses.
Our realization of Hyp3rArmor used specific AT encoding
options that work well in the context of traditional client-
sever internet settings. In future work, we intend to investigate
other AT encoding options that would be better suited for
different deployments, in particular deployments for native
mobile applications which will allow for a greater degree of
control over AT encoding.
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